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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CASE NO. 960745-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF QF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION QF THE COURT QF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment and conviction and 
commitment after convictions for Murder, a first degree felony, and 
five (5) counts of Theft, all second degree felonies. Appellant 
filed his Notice of Appeal with the trial court on September 9, 
1996. Jurisdiction is proper in either the Utah Supreme Court (78-
2-2(3)(I) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), or the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Thereafter, the appeal was lodged with the Utah Supreme 
Court, which poured the case over to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
pursuant to its vested authority to do so. Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2) (j ); 
1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES 
A. Did the trial court err in not severing the murder count 
from the theft counts?1 
Standard of Review: The Appellate Court reviews the trial 
court's decision denying appellant's Motion to Sever Counts by an 
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Straderr 902 P.2d 638 (Ut. 
App. 1995). 
B. Was appellant denied right to effective assistance of 
counsel?2 
Standard of Review: Since this claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the Court 
must decide whether appellant was deprived of the effective 
assistance of counsel as a matter of law. State v. Tennysonr 850 
P.2d 461, 466 (Ut. App. 1993). 
xThe motion was argued before the trial court on June 10, 
1996. See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, June 10, 1996. 
2New counsel was substituted for purposes of preparing this 
appeal, pursuant to Notice of Substitution of Counsel, filed with 
Utah Supreme Court on November 7, 1996. 
2 
C. Did the Court err in failing to obtain a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of appellant's right to counsel? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law in 
criminal cases are reviewed for correctness, State v. Thurmanr 
846P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1973). Additionally, appellate courts 
will review the sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact 
for correctness. State v- Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1981). 
The appellate court decides the matter for itself with no deference 
to the trial court's determination of law. State v. Delir 861 P.2d 
431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
D. Was there sufficient evidence to convict appellant? 
Standard of Review: The evidence and all inferences which may 
be reasonably drawn from it will be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. State v, Alvarezr 872 P.2d 
45Q (Utah, 1994), 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions and rules are relevant 
to the issues presented: 
Article I, Section 12, Utah State Constitution; 
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel. 
3 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses - To be filed in single 
court. 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, 
or informations charging multiple offenses, which may include 
violations of state law, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances 
and arising from a single criminal episode as defined by Section 
76-1-401, shall be filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of 
the charged offense with the highest possible penalty of all the 
offenses charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or 
information may not be separated except by order of the court and 
for good cause shown. 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended): 
Title 76-1-401: "Single criminal episode" defined - Joinder 
of offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different 
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case! 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Commitment 
convicting Appellant following a trial by jury, of the offenses of 
Murder, a first degree felony, and five (5) counts of Theft, all 
4 
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of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, 
State of Utah. 
11, Course Q£ JEroceeflinga: 
Appellant was tried, before a jury, Iin Summit County and 
convicted of the offenses of Murder a i::i i: s I: d e g r e e 
vinlr-iti in of I J tall Code Ann. 76-5-203, and five
 v^j counts ui theft 
(auto and four (4) firearms), all second degree felonies, in 
violation Utah Code Ann. I'M I "it1 .-m i
 fi.K m ) in i i ^ ( , 
State Prison to serve the indeterminate sentences provided by law. 
Judge Brian ordered consecutive sentences on al1 counts iincluding 
ami v i n i h r j i i c e m MI11 I i IJIIIr i MI! • i w<-kripnii. All proceedings occurred in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, State 
of Utah. 
On September b, xwu Appellant, through his trial counsel, 
filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court 
On: i N o v e m b e r ' I ' l ' i d IIIII i< i u n j u s t 1 : ! wiri1 i i i h c , t i 11 m I i < m I h u | u i p n s p s 
of preparing this appeal. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court! 
A Judgment tiiui Commitment in the case was entered by the 
Court August 26, 1996, committing Appellant to the Utah State 
Prison for a indeterminate term, no* exceed tivi (' | yedi i m t;o 
life for Count 1, Murder, a first degree felony; one to five (1-5) 
years for use of a dangerous weapon, to run consecutively to all 
counts; and five (5) sentences of one to fifteen (1-15) years for 
each of the Theft charges, counts 2 through 6, all sentences to run 
consecutively to all others. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On the late evening of August 7, 1995, the deceased body of 
Appellant's wife, Kayleen Jones Scales, was discovered. (Tr. 129-
133) She was found in her bed in the trailer she shared with 
Appellant on the Jones' family ranch, near Coalville, Utah. She 
had been shot multiple times in the head by a small caliber weapon, 
(Tr. 227), through a pillow that covered her head. (Tr. 323) 
Earlier that morning, Appellant had borrowed the car belonging 
to Mabel Jones, the victim's grandmother, indicating he had to go 
to work, claiming his car was disabled. (Tr. 183-84) She lived 
nearby on the ranch. The victim's mother, Kay, also lived a couple 
of hundred yards away from the Scales trailer. 
Found missing from the trailer were four (4) firearms 
belonging to Wade Jones, the victim's brother. (Tr. 137) 
Appellant's wallet was in the trailer which had been found locked. 
Appellant left Summit County and was apprehended the next day 
in Reno, Nevada, still in Mabel Jones' car, with two (2) of Wade 
6 
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firearms, including the Ruger 22 that was determined to be the 
weapon that caused the victim's death (r I 
Appellant was incarcerated in Coalville, awaiting trial. In 
February 1996, upon learning his first wife had just died 
cancer, Appellant iJiidei tool : a I HHI at s >>me I.oi. Ly • one ( 4 I! J i., 
The alarmed prosecutor petitioned the Court to commit Appellant to 
the State Hospital for evaluation, which it d J^ ^ e e Addenduir *v 
Appellant thereafter took a nose clxve, and Mi. Fratto attempted to 
withdraw as counsel for Appellant (See Addendum B) But the Court 
denied needed bo t:i: ::i a ] f ::)i: 
all intents and purposes, incommunicado There was no attorney-
cl lent relationship, nor had the Court obtained a waiver of 
Appellant's right to counsel. (See Addendum L j 
A Motion to Sever was filed, argued and denied. (Tr. June ,1 0 
charged and sentenced to consecutive sentences ±n prison. (See 
Addendum ^) 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMEM1 
The Court erred in failing to sever count one Murder, 
from counts two through six („! (i),, Auto -mid Firearms Theft The 
7 
counts were improperly joined, contrary to Rules 9.5, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and Title 76, Chapter 1, Section 401, Utah Code 
Ami. (1953 as amended). Rules 9.5 provides for multiple offenses 
being charged in a single Information. However, a single criminal 
episode as defined in 76-1-401, must only apply to conduct closely 
related in kind and incident to an attempt or accomplishment of a 
single criminal objective. That was not the case here. There was 
inconclusive evidence that the homicide and theft counts were 
closely related in time. Notwithstanding that, the theft charges 
were not incident to the accomplishment of the homicide and would 
not be otherwise admissible in the homicide trial any more than the 
homicide would be admissible in the trial on theft. 
2. Appellant did not receive effective assistance of counsel 
because the attorney-client relationship between Mr. Fratto and 
Appellant never developed to the minimal point required for 
effective advocacy. For whatever reasons, Appellant and his trial 
counsel established no trust. Counsel recognized the impossibility 
of trying to fashion a defense in such a situation and moved to 
withdraw from any further representation of Appellant. The Court 
denied that motion and the case proceeded to trial. Appellant and 
counsel had had no meaningful communication since April of 1996. 
8 
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appointed to prepare Appellant's defense. 
3 The Court erred in laiJiiiqi 1 obtain a knowing 
intelligent waiver of Appellant's riglit to counsel after finding 
that Appellant was not and would not cooperate with his counsel in 
p r e p a r . . a e f e n s e MM.1 wii1, I m i l riiim nml I  h|pj»eJ liiiiiill I IPI I |UPS : . 
self-representation or worse, electing to go forward with _IL 
representation, for which a waiver ~* *l_Kr ~A'~h+- +-~ counsel is 
ensure Appellant's waiver was knowing and intelligently made. 
A
 The evidence was insufficient to sustain the convicti on 
for murder and reasonable minds would differ regarding its 
sufficiency. There was insufficient evidence that Appellant 
caused I i •. i 1 1 II i» s. i lea t h 11 Appe 1 J 111 
did cause his wife'*; death, the evidence, when reasonably and 
dispassionately viewed, is that of manslaughter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAIL 
FROM THE THEFT CHARGES. 
The question here is whether the theft of the car and guns was 
indeed part o* a single criminal episode precipitated w murder, 
9 
and the answer is no. Rule 9.5 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
allows joinder, but the criteria must adhere to, and fit, the 
definition in Title 76-1-401 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended); 
i.e., to all conduct closely related in time and incident to an 
attempt or accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Joinder in this case was prejudicial. In State v. Germonto, 
868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), the court dealt with a single criminal 
episode involving joinder of a forgery with a robbery and homicide. 
The forgery occurred almost immediately after the robbery and 
homicide and the court found the offenses shared a single 
objective, to obtain property from the victim. 
Here, we don't know when the homicide occurred, but there is 
a possibility of at least twelve (12) hours of elapsed time before 
Appellant obtained the car and guns and left. There was no 
evidence the homicide was committed in order to facilitate stealing 
the car and guns, or that it was done to facilitate 
obtaining property from the victim. The car and guns didn't belong 
to the victim. 
The State argued that the evidence of the thefts would have 
been admissible in the murder case anyway because it was evidence 
of fleeing from a murder and disposing of the murder weapon, which 
can support an inference of a guilty mind. Fleeing is not an 
10 
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the gun was enough to allow the State to offer their inference t;e 
the jury. 
The Court abused its discretion in agreeing the thefts would 
be admissible anyway because there was no evidence to support the 
" c l o s e n e s s in I J in*-' n i fiii i i tint i l l Assuming H I yiiHiulu Il l icit I.1JP M I I 
died at 9:30 p.m. the day before her discovery, then the Appellant 
didn't leave in the car with the guns for some twelve (12) hours. 
1 1 II i i ' IN 11" f 1 p e l i i i j II mi ( " K J I I 111 I e i II in i n q t j n |,> I t 
how distant in time the two acts were. 
Appellant did not steal from the victim so there was no single 
criminal objective, such as obtaining property from the victim. 
State V. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), the court found 
joined because 
the two incidents were separated in time by a day and had separate 
objectives. 
unnecessary * JJ State motive, identit\ , .ntent, 
anything else. The fact that the Ruger was recovered and traced to 
Appellant fulfilled that showing. 
Tf was not: necessary to introduce evidence of unrelated thefts 
tc j:: i n >"•: Apije1 Lai :t t I c::i ] ] eel 1 i :i s w i l'e. 
1 1 
It would not be permissible to allow evidence that Appellant 
may have killed his wife to prove he took the car and failed to 
return it, and also took and sold the guns. The State would not 
need to show the Ruger was used to kill Kayleen Scales in order to 
prove Appellant took it from Wade Jones with intent to deprive him 
of it. The joinder was improper and it prejudiced the Appellant. 
The homicide and thefts were insufficiently related in 
temporal proximity, and did not comprise a single objective. Such 
was the case in State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977). In 
denying defendant's request for joinder, the court found the two 
crimes, aggravated robbery and kidnapping of passengers, had 
distinct differences in time, distance, location (2 different 
counties) and purpose. Defendant had taken a cop's gun, and while 
running from that, kidnapped passengers he had picked up. 
The court in State V, GQtfrey, 598 P.2d 132 (Utah 1979) 
reiterated the purpose of joinder is to conserve judicial resources 
and time, but warned to take care it is not misused to deprive 
defendant of a fair trial. 
"...by joining different offenses so that evidence 
concerning charges unrelated in time and nature, 
which would normally not be admissible upon a 
trial, could be admitted as to the multiple 
offenses in an effort to stigmatize the defendant 
and thus make it questionable that the jury would 
give a fair and dispassionate consideration to the 
12 
evidence on the first charge." 908 P.2d at 1328 
(citations omitted). 
The court is saying these joined offenses must relate in time 
and be similar in nature/ design, and victim. That is not the case 
here. 
The court in State v. Hagar 735 P. 2d 44 (Utah 1987), 
emphasized the objective of severance is to promote justice. In 
State v, Kerekesr 622 P.2d, 1161 (Utah 1980), the court emphasized 
the trial court must also determine if the probative value of the 
joined cases outweigh the probative effect. Here, the court just 
agreed with the prosecutor's conclusions and made no such finding. 
(Tr. (6-10-95) p. 20-23) (Addendum D) 
The Kerekes court cited State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d, 783 (Utah 
1977) in noting the sound policy of the law that evidence of prior 
crimes may not be admitted to show the propensity of a defendant to 
commit another crime. 
"But in situations where evidence of other crimes and wrongs 
is particularly relevant (emphasis added) in proving a specific 
element of the crime (emphasis added) for which the defendant is on 
trial, the evidence may be allowed for that purpose. (Citing State 
V, Lopez, 451 P.2d, 880 (Utah 1978), State v. Dicksonr 361 P.2d, 
412 (Utah 1961), 662 P.2d at 1165. 
13 
The evidence of the thefts was not of particular relevance to 
prove a specific element of homicide. Fleeing (or leaving the 
scene) is not an element of the offense, but merely a circumstance 
that can be considered for purposes of inferring a guilty mind. 
It was prejudicial to Appellant, and abuse of discretion, for 
the court to join these offenses merely to enable the State to 
offer an inference of guilt, not to prove any specific element of 
homicide. The evidence would have been such that the State could 
have offered that inference anyway, just from the fact that 
Appellant left the scene and sold the Ruger. Theft charges were 
unnecessary to establish that. 
The joinder of these counts stigmatized the Appellant and 
prejudiced his chance of a fair trial on the homicide charge. This 
Court should reverse that trial court order severance, and order a 
new trial. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Since this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
raised for the first time on direct appeal, the Court must decide 
whether defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of 
counsel as a matter of law. state v. Tennysonr 850 P.2d, 461, 466 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
14 
Ordinarily, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
addressed by collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings; 
however, in some circumstances, the claims may be raised on appeal. 
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Such 
circumstances exist when the defendant is represented by new 
counsel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the issues.3 
Government of the Virgin Island v. Zepp. 748 F.2d 125, 133-34 (3d 
Cir. 1984). These circumstances are present for the Court to 
review the ineffectiveness claim raised on appeal in this case. 
In cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Utah courts have adopted the two-part test of Strickland 
v, Washingtonr 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. See also State v. Tempiinr 805 P.2d, 
182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
3See Addendum B; Motion to Withdraw, and attached Affidavit 
submitted by trial counsel on May 2, 1996; and Addendum C. 
15 
In short, to demonstrate ineffectiveness, the defendant must show 
that there was a deficient performance which resulted in prejudice. 
The deterioration of the attorney-client relationship rendered 
Appellant's counsel ineffective as a matter of law. The Court 
erred by denying counsel's Motion to Withdraw. 
As noted, the right to effective assistance of counsel is of 
constitutional magnitude. In this instance, the deficient 
performance came about due to counsel's failure to establish even 
a minimal amount of trust, and at least a functional level of 
repore with Appellant, such that lines of communication would be 
open and Appellant could meaningfully participate in, and aid 
counsel in his defense. 
According to counsel's Affidavit in support of his motion to 
Withdraw, there was no confidence expressed in counsel by the 
Appellant from the outset. Apparently, there were disagreements 
regarding a motion for change of venue, among other difficulties. 
Appellant apparently felt counsel was involved in the commitment to 
the State Hospital against Appellant's will. A Bar complaint was 
filed against counsel. Appellant tried to fire counsel. 
Regardless of the cause(s), the attorney-client relationship 
never got off the ground. By May 1, 1996, the Appellant and his 
counsel were no longer communicating. That made preparing for a 
16 
murder trial a joke. Again, it matters not who was to blame, or 
who was right or wrong. Perhaps Appellant was wrong or mistaken. 
Perhaps he wasn't as competent as he was found to be. Maybe 
counsel did or did not do something to shatter Appellant's 
confidence in him. It matters not. The point is, counsel acted 
properly in moving to withdraw, and the Court erred in not allowing 
it. 
Appellant's written request to counsel for more information 
regarding his case, as reflected in counsel's Affidavit, is further 
confirmation of a nonworking relationship with his defense 
attorney. Counsel rightfully recognized the nonexistent 
relationship. He knew he could not formulate a defense. He could 
not adequately represent appellant. 
Appellant indicates he was unaware of the recovery of the 
Ruger until the June 10 hearing when the prosecutor mentioned it 
and that ballistic tests were being conducted. (See Tr. p. 10) 
Because appellant was so alienated from counsel, no meaningful 
efforts could be made to resolve the matter short of trial, in 
light of the new evidence. Counsel knew that he would not be able 
to properly defend appellant and said so. 
This was an egregious, severely strained situation that would 
have been avoided by allowing counsel to withdraw. Instead, it 
17 
festered all the way to trial, to Appellant's prejudice. 
The Courtf s rationale for denying the Motion to Withdraw was 
inadequate to override Appellant's right to counsel. Any delay or 
inconvenience created by a substitution of counsel is 
inconsequential in light of the Court's obligation to ensure 
Appellant is adequately represented, especially when facing such 
serious charges. 
With Appellant and counsel incommunicado, Appellant did not 
aid in his defense. He did not testify at trial. Perhaps a 
manslaughter defense was available. It was error as a matter of 
law for the Court to allow the trial to go forward with counsel 
handcuffed. Perhaps a defense was compromised. 
The Court should have appointed different counsel. Counsel 
recognized he couldn't do his job. This Court should find as a 
matter of law that Appellant did not have effective assistance of 
counsel. Counsel was forced into the role of "mere presence of 
counsel." That's not the test. The Court's ruling on the motion 
should be reversed and the matter should be remanded back to the 
trial court for a new trial. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OBTAIN A KNOWING 
AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
18 
If this Court decides Appellant willfully compromised his own 
defense by not cooperating with his counsel, then the trial court 
erred in not obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of the 
right to counsel from Appellant. Instead, it just ordered 
everybody to proceed. (See Addendum C) Trial courts have an 
affirmative duty to determine that a defendant who chooses self-
representation, does so knowingly and intelligently. State v. 
Drobelr 815 P.2d 724 (Ut. Ct. App. ) cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1991), citing Faretta v. California. 442 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 
2525, 456.Ed 2d 562 (1975), 
Appellant never openly requested self representation, but by 
not cooperating with counsel (whether his reasons were valid or 
not) he, in fact, was waiving an important right to professional 
counsel. The Court failed to determine that appellant was doing so 
knowingly and intelligently. 
At the hearing on counsel's Motion to Withdraw, the Court 
merely found no basis for Appellant's noncooperation with his 
lawyer, and that there was no reason to believe he would cooperate 
with any attorney (See order, Addendum C). But the court did not 
find Appellant was doing so knowingly and intelligently. The Court 
did not take the Appellant's questionable mental health into 
account, but just ordered that counsel prepare for trial with or 
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without Appellant's cooperation. That is tantamount to a 
conclusion that Appellant had elected self-representation or worse 
yet, no representation. The Court's failure to obtain a knowing 
waiver of that right was reversible error as a matter of law. 
This determination regarding a waiver turns "upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including 
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Johnson 
v, Zerbstr 304 U.S. 458, 469, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 
(1938); United States v. Padella, 819 F.2d 952, 958 (10th Cir. 
1987) 
In State v. Framptonr 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987), the 
Supreme Court identified a penetrating, on-the-record colloquy 
between defendant and the trial court as the preferred method of 
ascertaining whether defendant understands the risks of self-
representation and, therefore, chooses that option knowingly and 
intelligently. 737 P.2d at 187. 
Here there was no colloquy nor any mention of defendant's 
mental health.4 
In Drobel the court noted: 
4Even though Appellant was found competent to stand trial, his 
mental health, as reflected by his counsel's representations of 
their problems, was still in question. 
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"...we believe that the question of mental 
competence to elect self-representation is 
encompassed within the requirement that the choice 
to exercise that right be knowing and intelligent." 
815 P.2d at 734 
Here the court made no inquiries nor any findings regarding an 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. It was patently absurd 
for the Court to order counsel to prepare a defense in a murder 
case with or without his client's cooperation. 
The Court, for all intents and purposes, found that Appellant 
was, in fact, choosing self-representation. In fact, his counsel 
was then acting under court orders to proceed. Counsel cannot 
properly represent his client in a vacuum. This Court should find 
the trial court failed to obtain a waiver of this important 
constitutional right as a matter of law, and remand for a new 
trial, 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION 
This case bears a close resemblance to the situation in ££a±£ 
v. Pfitree. 659 P.2d, 443 (Utah 1983). 
In Petree the court noted that even though the evidence was 
sufficient to prove that the death of the victim involved criminal 
activity, it was not sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable 
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doubt, that defendant caused the victim's death intentionally and 
knowingly. 
Even when viewing the evidence in this case in a light 
favorable to the verdict, it was nevertheless insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of murder. Reasonable minds would differ 
regarding the sufficiency of this evidence. 
The evidence here was that Appellant and his wife were living 
together in a trailer on her family's ranch. There was no evidence 
that Appellant mistreated or abused his wife. In fact, he may have 
rescued her from destitution. (Tr. 143-144) The victim's mother 
testified to briefly hearing raised voices coming from the Scales 
trailer some 200 yards away from her home about 24 hours before the 
victim was discovered. (Tr. 167) No motive for an intentional 
murder was ever shown. Motive is not an element of murder, but in 
a circumstantial evidence case such as this, a motive becomes 
essential as a reason for the jury to make certain inferences from 
the circumstances presented. Without direct evidence of 
intentional murder, motive or lack of, looms large. 
The evidence is that some time, perhaps a long time, after the 
death of the victim—time of death was never established—Appellant 
borrowed Mabel Jones' car under false pretenses and left the scene. 
He failed to return the car and was apprehended in Reno, Nevada, 
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still in Ms, Jones' car, with two (2) of Wade Jones' firearms in 
the trunk. He sold two (2) firearms, including the Ruger 22, 
i 
i 
leaving a receipt for one of them. 
There was no direct evidence that he killed his wife and even 
if defendant did cause the death, it was manifestly insufficient to 
prove that he did so intelligently, and knowingly, as was charged 
in the complaint. 
The Court reverses a jury verdict for insufficient evidence 
when, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that 
verdict, it is sufficiently inconclusive, or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted fPetree, 
659 P.2d at 443). 
In Petree, evidence that defendant was the last person to be 
seen with the victim, that defendant left town after the victim's 
disappearance was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he caused the victim's death, or, if he did, that he did 
so intelligently and knowingly. Defendant even made a statement 
regarding the victim's death in the context of a dream. The Court 
said that was still not enough. 
Here, Appellant also left town in a car he had initially 
borrowed, and also took and sold a couple of firearms including the 
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weapon that had apparently been used to kill his wife. That fact, 
like the statement in Petreer still does not add up to enough 
evidence that Appellant committed an intentional murder. He 
certainly may have caused his wife's death, but the evidence, as 
seen in any light, was of a crime of passion, manslaughter - what 
with the torn-up marriage certificate, (Tr. 318), the messy room, 
the multiple shots and the very real possibility that Appellant 
stayed with the body of his wife for many hours before leaving - it 
is evidence that everything flew out of control, rather than a 
setting for deliberate murder, in order to steal grandmother's car 
and take brother's weapons? 
Here, we don't know when the victim was killed, we don't know 
why she was killed. We don't know what was said, we don't know who 
tore up the marriage certificate, or why. We don't know how long 
Appellant remained on the scene after the death. We only know he 
left. He borrowed the car from Mabel Jones, as opposed to just 
taking it without her knowledge. We don't know if he was fleeing 
a murder or numbed by shock and confusion. 
Some of this only Appellant can tell us. But he and counsel 
were estranged from the beginning and no defense was presented. 
(See points 2, 3 above.) 
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The State argued that whatever Kay Jones heard the day before 
was the premise, the motive for a violent, depraved murder, and 
that Appellant's intent was to suddenly kill his wife, steal a car, 
steal guns and run. He also may have been out of his mind with 
grief and fear. Lacking any reasonable motive, reasonable minds 
would have enough doubt about this evidence to differ as to intent. 
The evidence more correctly points to manslaughter. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits the improper joinder of the charges against 
him prejudiced his case. The Court erred in denying severance 
because the charges did not qualify as a single criminal episode. 
The Court should reverse that finding, order severance, and 
grant a new trial. 
Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel, as 
verified by counsel in a Motion to Withdraw, and the Court erred in 
denying that motion. Appellant and counsel had no attorney-client 
relationship that was in any way conducive to the preparation for 
and presenting of a defense, especially in light of this 
circumstantial evidence case. This Court should find as a matter 
of law that Appellant lacked effective assistance and grant a new 
trial. 
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The Court failed to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
Appellant's right to counsel after finding that Appellant was not 
cooperating with his counsel. This was tantamount to finding 
Appellant was requesting self-representation or no representation, 
which requires a knowing, intelligent waiver on the record of the 
right to counsel. This Court should find that failure to obtain a 
waiver is reversible error. 
The evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction 
wherein reasonable minds would differ on the sufficiency therein 
and the Court should reverse the jury finding, and either remand 
the matter for a new trial, or enter a finding of manslaughter on 
count one and remand the matter for resentencing. 
day of ^yZ^ujZsi*^ , Dated this ^-^ day of ^*M*<uj3U<stsy , 1997. 
Respectfully submitted, 
<^~-
MANNY GARCIA 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, MANNY GARCIA, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this T"L day of 
<ZJ~u<^* , 1997. 
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ADDENDUMS A - E 
A Q}Q/G* lr\ d u m A 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
PLAINTIFF 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
DEFENDANT. 
PETITION FOR INQUIRY INTO 
MENTAL CONDITION OF DEFENDANT 
CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS 
Robert W. Adkins files this Petition pursuant to the provisions of Title 77, Chapter 15, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and alleges as follows: 
1. That he is the duly elected, qualified, and acting County Attorney of Summit County, 
State of Utah. 
2. That defendant, Carl William Scales, is presently housed in the Summit County 
Jail awaiting trial, which is presently scheduled for May 29, 1986, on the charge of Murder. 
3. That Carl William Scales, age 34, may be mentally ill, and is an immediate 
danger to himself, and should be committed to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 77-15-1 et seg, UCA 1953, as amended. Such belief is based upon the following 
facts: 
A. Carl William Scales has not eaten any food for the past 41 days. Carl 
William Scales is drinking coffee, water, and juice, but has refused any other nutrients. 
B. Carl William Scales is charged with murdering his second wife, Sheila 
Kayleen Scales. 
C. Carl William Scales discovered approximately 41 days ago that his first 
wife had passed away, apparently from cancer. After receiving that news, Carl William 
Scales has refused to eat solid food. 
D. Carl William Scales is apparently depressed over the death of his first 
wife. Carl William Scales told jailer Gale Pace that he wants to experience the suffering 
that his first wife experienced while she was dying of cancer, and for that reason has 
refused to eat. 
E. The jail staff is concerned about the depression of Carl William Scales, 
and his deteriorating physical condition. The jail staff has attempted to convince him to 
eat. but Carl William Scales refuses to do so. 
F. The jail staff has made arrangements for Carl William Scales to be 
examined by a physician, but Carl William Scales has refused to see or be examined by 
the physician. 
G. The Summit County jail staff has made arrangements for Carl William 
Scales to be seen by a mental health professional from Valley Mental Health, but Carl 
William Scales refuses to be seen or examined by any mental health professional. 
4. Carl William Scales is represented by his attorney, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., 431 
South 300 East, #101. Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, (801) 322-1616. 
5. The Summit County jail staff know of no other relative for Carl William Scales. 
6. Affiant, upon information and belief, alleges that this court should fix a time for 
an examination by the court into the mental condition of the defendant to determine whether the 
defendant is competent to proceed with the criminal charges that have been filed against him. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that this court order the said Carl William Scales be 
committed to the Utah State Hospital for a period not to exceed 30 days for observation and 
treatment and upon termination of such commitment, the said Carl William Scales shall be 
returned to his original custody and thereupon this court shall proceed with the examination into 
the mental condition of the said Carl William Scales to detennine whether he is competent to 
proceed. 
DATED this day of March, 1996. 
ROBERT W. ADKINS 
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of March, 1996. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: _ 
My commission expires: 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER FOR EXAMINATION INTO 
PLAINTIFF : THE MENTAL CONDITION OF 
DEFENDANT 
VS. : 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, : CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS 
DEFENDANT : 
A verified Petition having been filed pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 15, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in the above-entitled matter asserting upon information and belief 
that Carl William Scales may be incompetent to proceed and that the said Carl William Scales 
is presently being held at the Summit County Jail in Coalville, Utah, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the said Carl William Scales be committed to the Utah State Hospital 
for a period of 30 days for observation and treatment, and tiiat upon termination of said 
commitment, that the said Carl William Scales shall be returned to the Summit County Jail. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all proceedings pending against Carl William Scales 
shall be stayed until the proceedings to determine his mental condition are terminated. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to affect said examination, the said Carl William 
Scales shall be transported to the Utah State Hospital at Provo, Utah, by the Summit County 
Sheriffs Department, as soon as possible, to be held during such examination, and upon 
completion thereof, return the said Carl William Scales to the Summit County Jail to be there 
held awaiting further order of this court. 
DATED this day of March, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
rPAT B/ BRIAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, 
this 22nd day of March, 1996, to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 
East, #101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION TO FORCE-FEED 
DEFENDANT, CARL WILLIAM 
PLAINTIFF SCALES 
VS. : 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, : CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS 
DEFENDANT. : 
COMES NOW plaintiff, by and through its attorney, Robert W. Adkins, Summit County 
Attorney, and respectfully shows the court: 
1. That T am die duly elected, qualified, and acting county attorney of Summit 
County, Utah. 
2. That defendant, Carl William Scales, is presently housed in the Summit County 
Jail awaiting trial, which is presently scheduled for May 29, 1986, on the charge of Murder. 
3. Carl William Scales has not eaten any food for the past 41 days. Carl William 
Scales is drinking coffee, water, and juice, but has refused any other nutrients. Carl William 
Scales is charged with murdering his second wife, Sheila Kayleen Scales. Carl William Scales 
discovered approximately 41 days ago that his first wife had passed away, apparently from 
cancer. After receiving that news, Carl William Scales has refused to eat solid food. Carl 
William Scales is apparently depressed over the death of his first wife. Carl William Scales told 
jailer Gale Pace that he wants to experience the suffering that his first wife experienced while 
she was dying of cancer, and for that reason has refused to eat. The jail staff is concerned about 
the depression of Carl William Scales, and his deteriorating physical condition. The jail staff 
has attempted to convince him to eat, but Carl William Scales refuses to do so. 
4. The jail staff has made arrangements for Carl William Scales to be examined by 
a physician, but Carl William Scales has refused to see or be examined by the physician. 
5. Carl William Scales is represented by his attorney, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., 431 
South 300 East. #101. Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, (801) 322-1616. 
I 
6. The Summit County jail staff know of no other relative for Carl William Scales. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that this court issue and Order directing the Utah State 
Hospital, the Summit County Jail, or any other facility having the custody of Carl William 
Scales to force-feed Carl William Scales interveinously or otherwise. 
DATED this 22nd day of March, 1996. 
Robert W. Adkins 
Summit County Attorney 
en & u, TV\ E> 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-1616 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW 
Case No. 951300063 FS 
Judge Pat Brian 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., herein moves the court for leave to 
withdraw as attorney of record in the above-entitled matter, on the 
grounds and for the reasons that counsel is unable to adequately 
and effectively represent the defendant as fully set forth in the 
Affidavit of Counsel, attached hereto. 
A" DATED this 1996. 
JRr 
Defendant 
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JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-1616 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 951300063 FS 
Judge Pat Brian 
STATE OF UTAH 
J SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., upon his oath, deposes and says the 
following: 
1. That I am the attorney of record representing Carl W. 
Scales, in the above-entitled matter. I was appointed to represent 
the defendant pursuant to a contract to provide said 
representation. 
2. That trial in the above matter is scheduled for May 29, 
1996, and a hearing on motions is scheduled for May 13, 1996. 
3. That pursuant to the prosecutor's Petition For Inquiry 
Into Mental Condition of Defendant, defendant was sent to the Utah 
State Hospital. Following that evaluation and the return of the 
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report indicating defendant's competency to proceed with trial, a 
hearing was held on April 22, 1996. Present with counsel for the 
defendant was David West ley, who has been employed as an 
investigator to assist in the above-entitled matter. The defendant 
indicated to affiant, at this hearing, that he did not wish to 
speak to him or cooperate in the preparation of the case. The 
defendant expressed to the court that he did not want to proceed 
with affiant as his counsel. 
4. That on or about April 25, 1996, a copy of a letter sent 
by defendant to the Utah Bar Association was received by affiant. 
In that letter defendant requests the Bar assist in changing the 
venue of the legal proceedings pending in this matter and outlines 
complaints with the investigator, aforesaid, and with affiant. 
Those complaints include a belief that counsel conspired with the 
prosecutor to have defendant committed to the hospital for the 
evaluation. Such allegations indicate a deterioration of the 
relationship between counsel and defendant, which relationship is 
necessary for adequate and effective representation. 
5. That on May 1, 1996 I attempted to have contact with 
defendant at the Summit County Jail. My request for an interview 
was refused by him. I subsequently received from defendant, 
further correspondence, dated April 29, 1996, in which defendant 
requests copies of "information relating to my case" and a specific 
list of information, including reports, evaluations and laboratory 
results. This request is a further indication of the deterioration 
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of the relationship and defendant's desire to have affiant withdraw 
as the counsel in the matter. 
6. That it is affiant's information and belief that 
defendant has independently filed motions, including a Motion for 
Change of Venue in the above matter. Defendant has not sent 
affiant copies of these pleadings. The filing of this motion and 
the failure to send a copy indicate an unwillingness to cooperate 
with counsel in preparation, a lack of trust, the deterioration of 
the relationship and a desire by defendant to have counsel 
withdraw. 
7. That the foregoing make it impossible for counsel to 
adequately and effectively represent defendant in the proceedings 
pending before the Court. 
DATED this ft day of jJ/I &*{,< 1996. 
;] : I -
/\.il~—' 'Hi i/, 
JOSgPH C.I/ FRATTO ; JR: 
, Affiant y 
O-
/ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this cj- day of \ \V&.M 
1996, in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. vi 
Notaiy Public J 
SHAUNA L WILLIAMS I 
431 South 300 East #101 I 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 I — — » -- , 
My Commission Expires • Notary Public 
JSS»iS | Residing at Salt Lake County 
My commission expires: "7/07/^^ 
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Ac/c/*.»\ «t«* ^ £-
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO WITHDRAW AND 
PLAINTIFF : GRANTING MOTION TO 
CONTINUE 
VS. : 
CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
DEFENDANT : 
The Motion of Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., for Leave to Withdraw as Attorney of Record in 
the above-entitled matter, came on regularly for hearing on the 8th day of May, 1996, at the 
hour of 8:30 a.m. The State of Utah was represented by Robert W. Adkins and Terry L. 
Christiansen. Defendant appeared in person and with his attorney, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. The 
court having listened to the arguments of counsel and statements of defendant, and good cause 
appearing therefore, it is 
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Leave to Withdraw be, and the same hereby 
is, denied. The basis for denial of said Motion is as follows: (1) Th& court had heretofore on 
the 22nd day of January, 1996, granted Defendant's Motion to Terminate the Services of Backup 
Public Defender, Glen A. Cook; (2) Defense counsel, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., is an experienced, 
qualified, and competent attorney to represent the defendant; (3) There is no legitimate basis for 
the defendant's position of not wishing to speak with or cooperate with his court-appointed 
counsel in the preparation of the case; and (4) There is reason to believe based on defendant's 
past behavior he will cooperate or be satisfied with another attorney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is continued from May 29, 1996, to July 9, 
1996, at the request of defendant's counsel to enable him to prepare for trial with or without the 
cooperation of defendant. 
DATED this & / day of May, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing this day of 
May, 1996, postage prepaid, to Joseph C. Fratto, attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 East, 
#101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
'ZvsS {^f/k/zM?-^ 
A d d«.r\ Ju »N D 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121 
Attorney for Defendant 
431 South 300 East, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-1616 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SEVER COUNTS OF 
THE AMENDED INFORMATION 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Case No. 951300063 FS 
Judge Pat Brian 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, by and through his attorney, JOSEPH C. 
FRATTO, JR., herein moves the court, pursuant to Rule 12 and Rule 
9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to sever and conduct a 
separate trial for Count I charging Murder, and Counts II - VI 
charging Theft, on the grounds and for the reasons that the 
substance of these offenses do not constitute a single criminal 
episode and incorporates the Memorandum in Support of Motion, 
attached hereto. 
DATED this IO day of , JHIJJ - 1996. 
/ / 
/ 
- — T 
/ / / 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
Attorney 'for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION, were delivered to Robert W. Adkins, Summit County 
Attorney, Summit County Attorney's Office, Summit County 
Courthouse, Coalville, Utah 84017, this ? day of 
•'
:
-- ' ^7 / - .- ••. 
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
PLAINTIFF : REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SEVER 
VS. : 
CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, : 
DEFENDANT. : Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant's Motion to Sever Counts II, III, IV, V and VI from Count I came on 
regularly for hearing before the court on June 10, 1996. Defendant appeared in person and with 
counsel, Joseph Fratto, Jr.; the State appeared through its attorney, Robert W. Adkins, Summit 
County Attorney and Terry L. Christiansen, Assistant Summit County Attorney. The court 
having considered the Motion and the pleadings submitted in support of and opposition to the 
Motion, having heard the arguments of counsel, and having verbally entered its decision on the 
record, hereby makes and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant stands accused of murdering his wife, Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales on or about 
August 6 or 7, 1995. 
2. The homicide is alleged to have been committed through the use of a .22 caliber 
firearm. 
3. That on August 7, 1995 at 9:00 a.m., the defendant went to the home of Mabel 
Jones, who is the grandmother of the victim, Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales. The home of Mabel 
Jones is located approximately 200 yards from the trailer where the defendant and the victim 
resided, and where the body of Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales was discovered later on August 7, 
1995. 
4. Defendant asked Mabel Jones if he could borrow her automobile to travel to an area 
called South Fork, which is just a few miles from the home of Mabel Jones in Summit County, 
Utah. The defendant claimed that his wife's vehicle had thrown a rod, and that he needed to 
borrow Mabel Jones' automobile. 
5. Mabel Jones agreed to loan the defendant her automobile, so that he could travel to 
South Fork. 
6. Shortly thereafter, the defendant left the scene of the murder. 
7. The State claims that at the time the defendant left the scene cf the murder on the 
morning of August 7, 1995, that he took with him four firearms belonging to Wade Jones, those 
being three 22 rifles and a 30-06 rifle. 
8. The State claims that the murder weapon was one of the 22 rifles that defendant took 
with him when he left the murder scene on the morning of August 7, 1995. 
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9. The State claims that the defendant sold the 30-06 rifle and one of the 22 rifles in 
Nevada on August 7, 1995 and August 8, 1995. 
10. The State claims that the other two 22 rifles were found in the trunk of Mabel Jones' 
vehicle when the defendant was arrested by the Nevada Highway Patrol on August 8, 1995 near 
Reno, Nevada. 
11. The trier of fact could draw a reasonable inference that the defendant committed the 
act of murder, for which he is charged in Count I, by the fact that the defendant fled from the 
murder scene. 
12. Evidence of defendant's flight will be presented at the trial, and evidence as to how 
defendant obtained possession of Mabel Jones' vehicle and that the defendant fled with four 
firearms, when he left the murder scene, will be presented to the trier of fact as part of the 
defendant's flight after allegedly committing the murder. 
13. The State has and will argue that the flight was accomplished by the defendant 
obtaining the vehicle from Mabel Jones and by taking the firearms to either finance defendant's 
flight from the murder scene, or to dispose of evidence from the murder scene, the .22 caliber 
rifle. 
14. The events of the homicide, and the thefts of the automobile and the four firearms 
are closely related in time and place. 
15. The defendant allegedly fled the murder scene shortly after the death of Sheila 
Kayleen Jones Scales and obtained the firearms from the trailer, in which the victim had been 
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killed, and obtained the vehicle belonging to Mabel Jones, approximately 200 yards from the 
scene of the murder. 
16. Flight is a factor that the trier of fact can consider in deiermining the guilt or 
innocence of the accused in this case. 
17. If the theft counts were severed from the murder count, the State would still be able 
to present its evidence regarding the theft of the vehicle and the firearms during the murder trial. 
18. The thefts of the car and firearms are integral, as they relate to the commission of 
the murder or flight after the commission of the murder. 
19. It is proper to join the murder charge in Count I with the theft counts in Counts II 
through VI inclusive. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. It is proper to join and to try Count I, Murder, with the Then charges as contained 
in Counts II through VI inclusive of the Information. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Sever should be denied. 
DATED this day of July, 1996. 
BY THE COURT. 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH,
 : ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SEVER 
PLAINTIFF : 
VS.
 : CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
 : 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
DI-I'liNDANT. : 
Defendant's Motion to Sever came on regularly for hearing on June 10,1996, before the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian, Districi < \)Urt Judge. Defendant appeared in person and with counsel, 
Joseph Fratto, Jr.; plaintiff appealed through Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney, and 
Terry L. Christiansen, Assistam Summit County Attorney. The court considered defendant's 
Motion, and the pleadings in support and opposition thereto, heard the arguments of counsel, 
having heretofore made and eniuod its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being 
fully advised in the premises, ii i-, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGl-D AND DECREED that defendant's Motion to Sever be, and 
the same hereby is, denied. 
DATED this day of July, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this 
15th day of July, 1996, to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 East, 
#101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF 
VS. 
CARL WILLIAM SCALES, 
D.O.B. 09-06-61 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS 
DEFENDANT. 
On the 26th day of August, 1996, appeared Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney, 
and Terry L. Christiansen, Assistant Summit County Attorney, Attorneys for the State of Utah, 
and the defendant appeared in person and by counsel, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted following a Jury Trial of the 
offenses of Murder, a First Degree Felony, as charged in Countt I of the Information; Theft, 
a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count II of the Information; Theft, a Second Degree 
Felony, as charged in Count III of the Information; Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged 
in Count IV of the Information; Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count V of the 
Information; and Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count VI of the Information; 
the court having asked if the defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be 
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the court, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State 
Prison for a period of five years to life and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime 
of Murder, a First Degree Felony, as charged in Count I. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate term of one to five years to run consecutively and not concurrently 
for the use of a dangerous weapon in the commission or furtherance of the offense of Murder 
for which defendant has been adjudged guilty. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State 
Prison for a term of 1 to 15 years and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime of 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count II; said sentenced to run consecutively with 
the sentences imposed in Count I and the enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State 
Prison for a term of 1 to 15 years and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime of 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count III; said sentence to run consecutively with 
the sentences imposed in Counts I and II, and the enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State 
Prison for a term of 1 to 15 years and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime of 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count IV; said sentences to run consecutively 
with the sentence imposed in Counts I, II, and III and the enhancement for use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State 
Prison for a term of 1 to 15 years and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime of 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count V; said sentences to run consecutively with 
the sentence imposed in Counts I, II, III, and IV and the enhancement for use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State 
Prison for a term of 1 to 15 years and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime of 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count VI; said sentences to run consecutively 
with the sentence imposed in Counts I, II, III, IV, and V, and the enhancement for use of a 
dangerous weapon. 
IT IS ORDERED that the Summit County Sheriff, D. Fred Eley, take the said defendant, 
without delay, to the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, where said defendant shall then and there 
be confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
DATED this 26th day of August, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, 
this 26th day of August, 1996, to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 
East, #101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
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